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Securing the premises
How effective are different home security devices, on their own and in 
combination with others? Andromachi Tseloni and Rebecca Thompson 
analyse crime survey data in search of answers
Waking in the middle of the night to the sound of a 
burglary in progress is a terrifying prospect for most 
people, as is returning home to find a ransacked house. 
To ward off such threats, people in the UK spend an 
estimated £100 million each year on home security 
measures such as window and door locks and burglar 
alarms, according to consumer research firm Mintel.
Household security comes in a variety of forms, 
and some devices are more effective in preventing 
burglaries than others. What is the relative likelihood 
of being burgled if the home owner has fitted, for 
example, lights on a timer or sensor and security chains 
instead of door and window locks?
Looking at the protection conferred by a particular 
security device or set of devices as if they operated 
in a void, without caring for whether (and which) 
other security exists, is not very helpful. It is therefore 
important to identify and compare the protective 
effect of each available security device in order to take 
informed security investment decisions. 
To weigh the relative merits of home security 
devices, and combinations thereof, we used data from 
the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), 
covering the years 2008/09 to 2011/12. The CSEW 
measures the extent of crime in England and Wales 
by asking people whether they have experienced any 
crime in the past year. In the most recent wave, roughly 
35 000 households were interviewed.
The survey asks respondents about their 
experiences of domestic burglary, whether any items 
were stolen and whether any damage was caused as 
a result. (The survey also covers attempted burglary, 
but we have excluded that category of crime from 
this analysis.) 
A subsample of survey takers are also asked to 
complete the Crime Prevention Module, which asks 
about the presence of security devices in the home. The 
list of devices includes burglar alarms, door deadlocks 
or double locks, window locks, dummy alarm boxes, 
security chains, window bars or grilles, external lights 
on a timer or sensor, indoor lights on a timer or sensor, 
and closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras. 
With this data to hand, we set about assessing 
the protective effect of each device on its own and in 
combination with other devices (limited, that is, to 
the most frequently seen combinations of devices – 
exploring all possible combinations of nine items would 
have been unmanageable).
Table 1 shows how our assessments were 
made. The CSEW data we used contained security 
information on 37 416 households – which served as 
our “general population”. Of those households, 2245 
had been burgled. Among the general population, 1835 
homes had no security (a proportion of 0.049), while 
among the burgled households, 821 (0.366) had no 
security. Dividing the proportion of burgled homes 
without security by that of the general population 
crime
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(0.366/0.049) gave us an odds ratio (OR) for 
burglary victimisation without security of 7.46.
How much protection?
This OR was a crucial component in the 
next stage of our analysis – working out the 
security protection factor (SPF) for each 
device and device combinations. Our SPFs 
refer to the odds ratio of burglary risk in those 
households without security with respect to 
burglary risk within households with any set 
of security devices.1 
The SPF is expressed as:
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After rearranging the terms and cancelling 
out the overall burglary risk (burglary victims 
over total households), the numerator and 
denominator of the SPF are, respectively, 
the conditional burglary risks without and 
with security. 
Take window locks as an example. Table 
1 shows that window locks as a single security 
feature were present in 1765 households, 120 
of which had been burgled. The prevalence of 
homes with window locks as their only security 
feature is essentially the same in the general 
population and among burglary victims: 0.047 
and 0.053, respectively. The OR of burglary 
victimisation with window locks is therefore 
1.13, and – as one would expect – this is much 
lower than the OR for households without 
security (7.46, as previously mentioned). 
The SPF for window locks is calculated 
by dividing the OR of burglary victimisation 
of households without security by the OR of 
burglary victimisation with window locks – 
that is, 7.46/1.13 = 6.58. In other words, if 
your house or flat has window locks but no 
other security then it is roughly 6 times more 
protected from burglary than homes without 
security. However a one-tail hypothesis 
test indicated that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that window locks are equally 
prevalent in the general population as they are 
among victims. Therefore, we cannot conclude 
that window locks alone prevent burglary. 
Other factors may be at work.
Standalone measures
Table 1 presents similar calculations for other 
individual devices, listed in descending order 
of frequency in the CSEW sample. After 
window locks, the second most common 
security feature is door double locks or 
deadlocks, which are currently present in 
about 78% of homes (regardless of other 
measures). If your household is one of the 
roughly one in 42 with only this security 
measure then it is 2.8 times more protected 
than homes with no security.
External lights on a sensor or timer 
switch (which turn on with movement or 
remain on during the night) are a relatively 
Table 1. Security protection factors (SPFs) for selected security devices and combinations against burglary with entry
Security devices
Households 
with security 
information
Burgled 
households 
with security 
information
Proportion of 
households 
with security 
information
Proportion of 
burglary victims 
with security 
information Odds ratio SPFs
Total 37416 2245 – – – –
No security 1835 821 1835/37416 = 
0.049
821/2245  
= 0.366
0.366/0.049 
= 7.46
–
Single presence of selected security devices in the house/flat
Window locks 1765 120 0.047 0.053 1.13 7.46/1.13  
= 6.58
Door deadlocks or double locks 905 145 0.024 0.065 2.67 2.79
External lights 242 36 0.006 0.016 2.48 3.01
Burglar alarm 212 106 0.006 0.047 8.33 0.89
Selected combinations of security devices present in the house/flat
Window and door locks 5381 192 0.144 0.086 0.59 12.54
External lights, window and door locks 3307 43 0.088 0.019 0.22 34.41
Security chains, window and door locks 2743 38 0.073 0.017 0.23 32.30
External and internal lights, window and door locks 1537 14 0.041 0.006 0.15 49.12
CCTV, security chains, window and door locks 116 1 0.003 0.00045 0.14 51.90
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inexpensive means to avoid being targeted 
by burglars. Houses/flats with external 
lights alone are 3 times more protected from 
burglary than those with no security. If you 
do not possess any of the above, do not 
despair: other devices, such as security chains 
or CCTV cameras, used in isolation are also 
effective but to a lesser extent. 
Of all the SPF scores, the most 
curious is that of burglar alarms. Alarms 
fitted in a domestic property may reduce 
home insurance premiums. However, 
homes which have burglar alarms as their 
sole security feature would seem to be at 
marginally greater risk of burglary than those 
without security. 
Worried readers should note two points. 
Firstly, our counter-intuitive finding refers 
to the “average” burglar alarm in England 
and Wales: it does not examine technical 
specification, cost, installation year, whether 
the alarm is linked to a police station, or any 
other characteristic that may determine an 
alarm’s effectiveness.2 Secondly, there are 
very few homes that have only a burglar 
alarm – one in every 167 households, to 
be exact – and perhaps an alarm in this 
context acts as a beacon, alerting burglars to 
the prospect of valuable items, especially in 
poorer areas where other homes might not 
have such devices.
Stacked effects
Interviews with offenders suggest that, in 
isolation, many common household security 
measures have a limited deterrent effect.3 
Indeed, houses/flats with more security 
features have lower burglary rates, as can be 
seen in the CSEW data. And while SPF 
results may vary for individual devices, 
combinations of stronger and weaker devices 
can achieve economies of scale, as can be seen 
clearly in Figure 1. 
For example, the SPF for door double 
locks or deadlocks, if they are the only 
security measure in the home, is 2.79, while 
that of window locks is 6.58. However, the 
SPF of the two measures combined is 12.54, 
which is 3.17 points greater than the sum of 
its parts.
In addition to window and door locks, 
one in every 12 households also has external 
lights, and one in every 14 has security 
chains. These additions to the window and 
door lock combination raise SPF scores to 34 
and 32, respectively.
In general, homes with more devices are 
better protected than those with fewer security 
measures, but only up to a point – after 
which quality, expressed here as the collective 
preventive power of security combinations, is 
more important than quantity. 
Two combinations, consisting of four 
devices each, stood out in our analysis. The 
first includes CCTV cameras, window and 
door locks, and security chains. Together, 
these security measures offer 52 times more 
protection against burglary when compared to 
no security. This is a much higher SPF than 
would be expected from the sum of the SPFs 
of each individual device (13). However, this 
combination of devices is rare, being present 
in only one in every 323 homes – hardly 
surprising if one considers that CCTV 
cameras are unaffordable for most, and 
that security chains present a fire hazard. 
Therefore, this combination seems impractical 
for policy recommendations. 
A much better bet for home owners is 
the combination of devices we have termed 
WIDE: window locks, indoor lights on a 
timer, door double locks or deadlocks, and 
external lights on a timer or sensor. This setup 
affords 49 times more protection than no 
security, with an SPF score 33 points greater 
than the sum of the individual components. 
This combination is already present in 
roughly one in 24 homes, and with one in 
every 7 households already having window 
and door locks, the negligible additional 
cost of acquiring the necessary lights makes 
Some caveats
From a methodological perspective our analysis is far from perfect. Firstly, “no security” means 
“no security from the list of devices examined”. For instance, households participating in the 
survey may have a dog, or their houses/flats may have electric fences or a concierge – but this 
is still recorded as no security. 
Secondly, the home security, if any, of the most crime-suffering cohort of the population 
may be unknown. CSEW respondents who report crime experiences in the year prior to 
their interview are asked a detailed set of questions about the incidents via the survey’s 
Victimisation Module (VM). However, owing to length of interview concerns and survey funding 
considerations, respondents are only asked to complete a maximum of six VMs – three long 
versions and three short versions. The more serious the incident, the more likely it is to be 
examined by the long version of the VM, but this is the only version that includes questions 
about the presence of security devices in the home at the time of a burglary. Therefore, if 
burglary is of lesser seriousness when compared to other crimes experienced by a victim in a 
given year, details of their home security set-up might not be known.
Finally, the reduced sample of the CSEW Crime Prevention Module does not permit us to 
examine all possible security configurations.
Figure 1. Security protection factors (SPFs) of selected home security features based on the 2008/09–
2011/12 CSEW. Note: SPF values for all individual and combined security devices presented here are based 
on statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) one-tail difference of probabilities hypotheses tests except for the SPF 
value for window locks (shaded grey)
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it an attractive investment for further 
securing homes.
Wider benefits
Our findings would seem to endorse 
insurance policies that reward door and 
window locks in domestic properties, while 
questioning the wisdom of offering discounts 
for the presence of a burglar alarm in an 
unqualified manner. 
However, different households face 
different levels of burglary risk and lack 
effective security to a varying degree. We 
therefore sought to refine the previous 
analysis, which provided a national overview, 
by calculating conditional SPFs across 
socio-economic population groups and 
area types. To this end, we used bivariate 
or joint hierarchical logit modelling of the 
association between effective security and 
burglary victimisation that accounts for 
group composition, with household and area 
characteristics obtained from the CSEW and 
Census, respectively.
The results were telling: security is not 
the blanket solution to prevent burglary, and 
its effectiveness should be contextualised. 
Security plays an important but not 
unqualified role in burglary prevention: 
risk is not commensurate to absence of 
effective security. 
Figure 2 shows burglary victimisation 
and the presence of effective security (the 
WIDE combination) among social and 
private renters relative to home owners (the 
benchmark). Save for tenure, the estimates 
refer to households that are identical in all 
other individual and area characteristics (that 
were included in the models). 
The chart shows that private and social 
renters lack effective security to a similar 
extent (73% lower than owner-occupiers) 
but the effect on the latter group is graver. A 
council housing tenant faces nearly double 
the odds of burglary victimisation compared 
to home owners, while someone renting 
privately has burglary victimisation odds 37% 
higher than the benchmark. The combined 
(blue and red) height of each bar in Figure 
2 in effect reflects the (conditional) burglary 
protection of WIDE for social and private 
renters, respectively. 
Similar comparisons can be undertaken 
across population groups with respect to 
an array of relevant (statistically significant) 
socio-economic characteristics, such as 
ethnic group, household composition and 
others. With respect to area characteristics, 
one may reasonably expect that households 
living in affluent areas may be at higher risk 
but also more protected than residents of 
deprived neighbourhoods. In reality, the 
opposite occurs: the more deprived an area 
is the higher the burglary risk faced by the 
households living in it, and the lower the 
presence of effective security.
Our analysis suggests that ever more 
security does not neatly translate to burglary 
reductions. The efficiency of security – 
installing the best-performing devices and 
combinations of devices – is paramount. 
Still, some population groups would benefit 
more from effective securitisation than 
others. Our findings can guide future crime 
prevention policies to tackle burglary via 
security investments that parallel need and 
expected gains. 
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Figure 2. Odds ratios of burglary victimisation and presence of external and internal lights, window and door 
locks (WIDE) of social and private renters with respect to owner-occupiers, based on the 2008/09–2011/12 
CSEW. Notes: 1. The baseline category of tenure is owner-occupiers with odds ratio value of 1 for both 
burglary victimisation and presence of WIDE. Social (first bar) and private (second bar) renters’ odds ratios 
for each outcome are compared to that of owner-occupiers. The blue part of each bar denotes burglary 
victimisation. The red part denotes the presence of WIDE. For example, social renters are nearly twice 
(2.9 – 1 = 1.9) as likely to be victims of burglary and 73% (100 × (1 – 0.27)) less likely to have WIDE compared 
to owner-occupiers of otherwise identical characteristics. 2. The estimated parameters of the joint (bivariate) 
hierarchical logit model of burglary victimisation and presence of WIDE for tenure have p ≤ 0.01 except for 
the private renters’ coefficient of burglary victimisation which has 0.05 < p  ≤ 0.10.
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